ABSTRACT With the widespread application of the Internet of Things (IoT) technology, it is expected to become a new data management model. But IoT devices have limited resource storage and computing power, they are highly vulnerable to hackers and leak sensitive information to third parties. The traditional attribute-based searchable encryption schemes usually require an intelligent terminal to perform complex calculations while accessing data, therefore IoT devices may not be able to withstand excessive calculation burden. In this paper, we present a keyword searchable attribute-based encryption scheme with equality test (KS-ABESwET) in the IoT by combining the notions of attribute-based searchable encryption (ABSE) with equality test. The proposed scheme adopts a keyword search algorithm based on the inverted index and equality test mechanism. If the keyword token match index is successful, the cloud server sends all ciphertexts that meet the conditions to the data user. Then, data user classifies the ciphertexts by equality test mechanism, which is executed by the authorized cloud server to determine whether the two ciphertexts encrypted by different access policies contain the same plaintext without decrypting. In this way, data user does not need to decrypt all ciphertexts, which decreases storage resource consumption of IoT devices and simplifies the complex operations generated by the traditional ABSE schemes. Using outsourcing technology, most calculations in the scheme are outsourced to the server, and IoT devices only perform a few calculations, which reduces greatly the computing and storage burden. Based on the decisional q − 1 assumption and decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, the proposed scheme proves that has chosen-plaintext security and chosen-keyword security. Moreover, through comparative analysis and experimental simulation, our scheme is effective and suitable for IoT environment.
I. INTRODUCTION A. MOTIVATION
IoT technology proposes the interconnection between different devices, such as smart phones, infinite sensors, RFID etc, achieves data collection, transmission and storage [1] . These IoT devices are widely used in companies, factories, and everyday life, thus data security and privacy protection are crucial. In particular, although IoT devices are diverse in variety, their storage and computing capabilities are limited, it is necessary to reduce their computation burden. In the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Tony Thomas. application of IoT, data is always dynamically shared in a diverse distributed network [2] . In order to prevent unauthorized data users accessing data, it is important to adopt searchable encryption, access policy and equality test mechanism.
The attribute-based encryption (ABE) system [3] is an encrypted access control mechanism that effectively protects privacy and data security. It provides flexible data sharing for data users in the system, allows data owners to perform more detailed encryption operation for specified features. The decryption algorithm is a process that matches with the specified feature description value, so that data user who satisfies the condition can decrypt ciphertext. Generally speaking, ABE technology is mainly divided into two types: key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [4] and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [5] . In KP-ABE schemes, the data user's secret key is related to access policy, the ciphertext is related to attributes, CP-ABE schemes are opposite. Therefore, the difference between CP-ABE and KP-ABE scheme mainly depends on who is involved in access policy in the encryption system.
Since the cloud server stores the encrypted data, these ciphertexts no longer have the semantic features of plaintext. Their logical relationships and size rules are different from the plaintext. Hence, the plaintext search method is not suitable for ciphertext search. The searchable encryption (SE) technology realizes the search function on the ciphertext. The data user searches for ciphertexts based on the keyword of interest and then decrypt them, which improves the usability of cloud storage and cloud computing. In addition, the proposed ABES mechanism [6] implements keyword search for fine-grained access control. Particularly, the setting of file index is very important in keyword search. The inverted index is highly effective for a large dataset, because the search result directly points to relevant files when the inverted list matches with query keyword. In other words, the data user can search for multiple corresponding files based on the keyword of interest.
For many existing ABE schemes, the local computing burden is reduced by controlling the size of ciphertext. Although it decreases the storage cost, this is limited to the encryption phase. The data users still have to perform a lot of calculations during the decryption operation, which obviously does not apply to resource-constrained lightweight devices. In the outsourcing technology model, data users outsource most of the computational load to servers with strong computing power, and these servers will execute algorithms and return the results to data users. The outsourcing technology [7] is widely applied to different phases of the ABE schemes, which reduces the computation and communication burden of local devices while ensuring fine-grained access control.
For the sake of achieving data classification and accurate decryption, an equality test mechanism came into being. The initial equality test is combined with public key encryption system, so that data user could perform equality test between two messages encrypted by different public keys. Later, KP-ABE with equality test (KP-ABEwET) and CP-ABE with equality test (CP-ABEwET) are proposed, which are determined by the authorized cloud server whether two ciphertexts encrypted by different access policies contain the same plaintext without decrypting ciphertext. For the combination of ABSE with equality test, the data user first makes an equality judgment on the searched ciphertexts, excludes ciphertexts that have the same plaintext, then decrypts the remaining ciphertexts, which saves time and reduces the workload.
Therefore, our solution fully considers the practical application of ABE scheme, analyzes problems of the existing schemes, combines searchable encryption, outsourced computing and equality test mechanism to construct KS-ABESwET for the IoT environment.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
Owing to the limited calculation, resource and energy of IoT devices, they are not sufficient to bear a large amount of computing and storage burden, traditional ABSE schemes may be difficult to realize flexible and effective data sharing in IoT environment. Thus, we propose a KS-ABESwET in IoT. Our main contributions are as follows:
(1) Our scheme combines ABSE with equality test. Under the premise of ensuring fine-grained access control, data user first searches ciphertexts according to the keyword of interest, and then classifies all ciphertexts by the equality test mechanism which could judge whether the two ciphertexts encrypted by different access policies contain the same plaintext without decryption, so as to exclude ciphertexts that have same plaintext, and finally data user decrypts the desired ciphertexts. In this way, invalid repeat operations in the decryption phase are avoided.
(2) The proposed scheme is applicable to resourceconstrained devices in IoT environment. Specifically, most of the computational load during the secret key generation, encryption and decryption phases is outsourced to server, IoT devices only need to perform few operations, which greatly reduces the local computing and storage burden.
(3) On the basis of decisional q − 1 assumption and DDH assumption, our scheme proves that has the chosen-plaintext security and chosen-keyword security. Moreover, through comparative analysis and experimental simulation, the proposed scheme is effective and practical.
The structure of this paper is laid out as follows. Section II introduces the related work. Section III describes the notation definitions, mathematical knowledge and complexity assumptions. Section IV is a framework of the paper. In Section V, The details of the paper are given. Section VI is a security proof of the paper.The performance analysis and experimental simulation are in Section VII. Finally, the conclusions and future research directions of the paper are presented.
II. RELATED WORK A. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
ABE is a generalization of the identity-based encryption (IBE) [8] , [9] , which replaces the identity in IBE with attribute, and first proposed by Sahai and Waters [10] in EUROCRYPT 2005. ABE technology plays an important role in the fine-grained access control system [11] - [14] . In 2006, Goyal et al. [12] proposed the first monotonous access policy in KP-ABE scheme, but the KP-ABE scheme is not as flexible as CP-ABE, because once the data user's secret key is confirmed, the access structure is determined accordingly, which leads the encryption operation to difficult, and the data owner needs to choose a suitable attribute set for ciphertext. Subsequently, Bethencourt et al. [15] proposed the first CP-ABE scheme, the scheme only analyzes the security under the general group model and does not achieve provable security. In 2018, Liu et al. [16] proposed an efficient 80676 VOLUME 7, 2019 revocable CP-ABE scheme, the scheme adds time validity technique based on direct revocation, but has restriction for repeated attributes. In 2019, Li et al. [17] proposed an ABE scheme with CCA2 security for fog computing. Wu et al. [18] combined ABE technology with the blockchain to achieve privacy protection and track the private key of malicious users, but the decryption algorithm of the scheme needs to be further optimized. Li et al. [19] proposed a hierarchical ABE scheme with the help of hierarchical ideas. Considering side channel attacks, the scheme adopts leakage-resilience technology. Currently, the application of ABE technology is very extensive, including: cloud computing [20] , cloud storage [21] , [22] and personal health records [23] , [24] .
B. SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION WITH INVERTED INDEX
SE was first proposed by Song et al. [25] , the scheme supports keyword search, but does not set index, which means server must scan the entire system to find the file that meets requirements, results in significant resource loss. Subsequently, many searchable symmetric encryption schemes were proposed, including static and dynamic schemes [26] , [27] . In order to improve search efficiency and save costs, some schemes [28] - [30] set different index structures, and the schemes [31] , [32] established secure SE based on inverted index. In 2011, Curtmola et al. [31] proposed the first SE scheme based on inverted index, but this scheme dose not support dynamic encryption and index operations. In 2015, Wang et al. [33] proposed a public key SE scheme based on inverted index, which supports multi-keyword search, but cannot achieve fine-grained access control.
C. OUTSOURCING TECHNOLOGY
In ABE schemes, as the number of attributes in access policy increases, which leads to a high computation burden of encryption and decryption phase. In fact, due to the fundamental nature of bilinear mapping, ABE schemes usually have more pairing operations. Therefore, this is a huge limitation for resource-constrained devices. To solve this problem, some ABE schemes [34] - [37] generated constant-size ciphertexts during the encryption phase, or controlled the number of bilinear operations. However, the methods adopted by these schemes lacked ideal expressions. In 2011, Green et al. [38] proposed a new method, which is similar to the concept of proxy re-encryption [39] , that is in decryption phase, the data user generates a conversion key based on the secret key and sends it to third party to execute partial decryption, which outsources a large number of operations to the server and reduces the data user's local computing burden. In 2017, the scheme that supports outsourced encryption and decryption was proposed by Shao et al. [40] , which adopts a two-step outsourcing operation and reduces the amount of computation in both encryption and decryption phases. Subsequently, Belguith et al. [2] proposed a secure outsourced decryption ABE scheme for cloud-assisted IoT environment.
D. EQUALITY TEST MECHANISM
In 2010, the public key encryption with equality test scheme [41] solved the problem of whether two ciphertexts encrypted by different public keys contain the same plaintext without decryption, but this scheme allows anyone to perform equality test algorithm. Subsequently, some public key encryption with equality test schemes [42] - [44] added the concept of authorization, which improves security. In 2016, Ma et al. [45] first combined IBE with equality test (IBEwET). Later, Lee et al. [46] strengthened the security requirements of IBEwET scheme. Wu et al. [47] designed the IBEwET scheme for mobile cloud environment in 2017. In order to achieve fine-grained access control, many ABE with equality test schemes [48] - [50] were proposed. In 2017, Zhu et al. [48] proposed a KP-ABEwET scheme, which enjoys a more flexible authorization process, but this scheme is proved to be unsafe by Liao et al. [49] . Recently, Wang et al. [50] proposed a CP-ABEwET scheme based on the bilinear pairing and Viéte formula, which achieves multi-function and secure data sharing in cloud computing. The Figure 1 is a brief introduction to the process of equality test algorithm. Alice receives two ciphertexts CT A and CT B , delegates the authorized cloud server (ACS) to perform equality judgment on the two ciphertexts. She first sends the trapdoor request of ciphertext test to Bob in the same system. Then Bob returns trapdoor T R B to Alice, Alice generates its own trapdoor T R A and transmits two pairs of ciphertexts and trapdoors: (CT A , T R A ) , (CT B , T R B ) to the ACS to execute equality test (two ciphertexts do not need to be decrypted during testing). If the two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext, ACS returns 1 to Alice, otherwise returns 0.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATION DEFINITIONS
Our scheme contains many mathematical symbols, in order to improve the readability of the paper, we list these symbols and their explanations (as shown in Table 1 ). 
B. BILINEAR MAPPING
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups whose order is prime p, g be a generator of G 1 . Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear mapping when it satisfies the following characters [51] :
(1) Bilinearity:
C. LSSS ACCESS POLICY
Let P be a set of entities, a LSSS defined on P includes [52] : 1) The shares for each entity form a vector over Z p ; 2) There is a shared matrix M of size l × n for and a mapping ρ from {1, 2, · · · , l} to P. We randomly select a vector v = {s, v 2 , v 3 , · · · , v n } ∈ Z n p , where s is a secret, v i is a random value in Z p . Then Mv T is a vector of l shares of s based on , the share M i v T belongs to entity ρ (i), and is expressed
LSSS defined by the above method is reconstruction: Suppose that is a LSSS for access policy . On the one hand, for the authorized set of data user S ∈ , we define
On the other hand, for the unauthorized set of data user, there is a vectorω ∈ Z n p , so that
D. INVERTED INDEX
In SE system, the inverted index [53] is used to improve the search efficiency of file, which is a more practical structure, as shown in 
E. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
The security of our scheme relies on the decisional q − 1 assumption [52] and DDH assumption [54] . The description of these complexity assumptions are as follows: to perform algorithms. For example, AA is responsible for executing the Setup and KeyGen algorithm. The specific description is shown in the next two subsections.
1) SCHEME FRAMEWORK
The structure of scheme is shown in Figure 2 , (1) to (11) are the algorithms in the scheme. It mainly contains eight parties. Attribute Authority (AA). AA is in charge of system establishment. It generates public parameter and master secret key, and collaborates with OKGS to generate the data user's secret key.
Cloud Server (CS). CS takes charge of storing uploaded data and helping data user to search for desired ciphertext according to the index, then it returns corresponding result.
Outsourced Key Generation Server (OKGS). OKGS produces data user's outsourced secret key according to public parameter and sends it to AA.
Outsourced Encryption Server (OES). OES generates outsourced ciphertext based on the access structure and returns it to DO.
Outsourced Decryption Server (ODS). After receiving partial ciphertext and partial secret key, ODS performs outsourced decryption algorithm, obtains the outsourced ciphertext, and then transmits it to DU. Authorized Cloud Server (ACS). ACS is responsible for judging the equality of two ciphertexts according to the equality test algorithm, and returns corresponding result.
Data Owner (DO). DO is in charge of encrypting data, collaborating with OES to generate ciphertext, and uploading it to CS. Data User (DU). DU is responsible for generating a token of the keyword and sending it to CS. If the search is successful, DU will gain the ciphertext, and then collaborate with ODS to obtain the plaintext. When it is necessary to determine whether two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext, DU sends two pairs of ciphertexts and trapdoors to ACS, ACS executes equality test algorithm and returns result to DU.
2) THE DEFINITIONS OF SCHEME
The proposed scheme mainly includes 11 algorithms: Setup, KeyGen out , KeyGen, Encrypt out , Encrypt, TokenGen, Search, Decrypt out , Decrypt, TrapGen, Equality Test, which are defined as follows:
The setup algorithm is performed by AA. Inputting security parameter κ, it outputs public parameter PP and master secret key MSK .
KeyGen out (PP, S) → SK . The outsourced key generation algorithm is performed by OKGS. Inputting public parameter PP and attribute set S, it outputs outsourced secret key SK .
KeyGen MSK , SK → SK . The key generation algorithm is carried out by AA. Inputting master secret key MSK and outsourced secret key SK , it outputs secret key SK .
Encrypt out PP, M, ρ, x ρ(i) → CT . The outsourced encryption algorithm is carried out by OES. Inputting public parameter PP and access policy (M, ρ, x ρ(i) , it outputs outsourced ciphertext CT .
Encrypt. The encryption algorithm is executed by DO. The encryption process is divided into two parts: encrypting files and encrypting keyword.
( 
The algorithm inputs public parameter PP, hash value
(ii) Encrypt − keyword PP, w, CT → Index. The algorithm inputs public parameter PP, keyword w and outsourced ciphertext CT , outputs keyword index Index.
Finally, the encryption algorithm outputs ciphertext CT = [1,m] , Index .
TokenGen PP, w , SK → Tok. The token generation algorithm is carried out by DU. Inputting public parameter PP, keyword w and secret key SK , it outputs keyword token Tok. VOLUME 7, 2019 Search (Index, Tok) → CT /⊥. 
TrapGen (PP, S, SK ) → TR. The trapdoor generation algorithm is performed by DU. Inputting public parameter PP, attribute set S and secret key SK , it outputs trapdoor TR.
Equality
The equality test algorithm is carried out by ACS. Inputting two pairs of ciphertexts and trapdoors: CT A , T R A and CT B , T R B . If two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext, the algorithm outputs 1 and otherwise outputs 0.
B. SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we present definitions of chosen-plaintext security and chosen-keyword security for the scheme. They are described as an interactive game between the adversary A and the simulator B (as shown in Figure 3 ). The game process mainly includes 5 stages: Setup, Phase 1, Challenge, Phase 2 and Guess. The specific interaction process is described in the secure game. 
1) GAME 1: CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT SECURITY
The chosen-plaintext secure game is as follows:
Initialization. A submits a challenge access policy
Setup. B executes Setup (κ) algorithm, produces public parameter PP and master secret key MSK , and makes PP to public. Phase 1. A sends an attribute set S to B and issues adaptive queries. However, the restriction is that the attribute set S cannot satisfy the access policy M * , ρ * , x ρ * (i) for each query.
Secret key query: B performs KeyGen out PP, S algorithm and KeyGen MSK , SK algorithm to produce the corresponding secret key, and returns to A. and Encrypt − files PP,
algorithm to obtain ciphertext CT * b , then sends it to A. Phase 2. A repeats the inquiry of Phase 1, but the restriction is that the attribute set cannot satisfy the access policy.
Guess. A outputs a guess b . If there is b = b, it means that A winning the game. The advantage of A wins the game is defined as
Definition 3. If any PPT adversary wins the above game at most with a negligible advantage, our scheme proves to be chosen-plaintext security.
2) GAME 2: CHOSEN-KEYWORD SECURITY
The chosen-keyword secure game is as follows:
Setup. B executes Setup (κ) algorithm to produce public parameter PP and master secret key MSK , while making PP to public. Phase 1. A issues adaptive queries: Token query: A gives a query keyword w , B runs TokenGen PP, w , SK algorithm, sends Tok to A.
Challenge. A chooses two keywords w 0 , w 1 at random, B flips a coin to select b ∈ {0, 1}, executes Encrypt − keyword PP, w b , CT algorithm to produce keyword index Index, sends it to A. Phase 2. A continues the inquiry of Phase 1, but the restriction is that A cannot query the keyword w 0 , w 1 anymore.
Guess. A outputs a guess b . If there is b = b, it means that A winning the game.
Definition 4: If any PPT adversary wins the above game at most with a negligible advantage, the proposed scheme proves to be chosen-keyword security.
V. KS-ABESwET
Aiming at resource-constrained IoT devices, through the analysis of existing schemes, we introduce the keyword search, outsourcing, equality test algorithm based on the general ABE scheme to construct our solution, realize various functions of cryptographic scheme. The proposed scheme mainly includes 11 steps, specific structure of the algorithm is described below.
Setup (κ) → PP, MSK : This algorithm inputs security parameter κ, it chooses a bilinear mapping e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , where G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups whose order is prime p, g is a generator of
master secret key MSK as follows:
Making PP to public. KeyGen out (PP, S) → SK : This algorithm takes public parameter PP and attribute set S as input. Let k indicate the size of S,
The algorithm outputs outsourced secret key
KeyGen MSK , SK → SK : This algorithm takes master secret key MSK and outsourced secret key SK . It performs the following calculation:
The algorithm outputs secret key
where
Let SK 1 be used to decrypt ciphertext and generate the trapdoor of equality test, SK 2 be used to produce the keyword token.
Encrypt out PP, M, ρ, x ρ(i)
→ CT : This algorithm inputs public parameter PP and access policy M, ρ, x ρ(i) . In the access policy M, ρ, x ρ(i) , M is a shared matrix of size l × n, ρ denotes a mapping from {1, 2, · · · , l} to P, that is map each row of M to an attribute, x ρ(i) is attribute value. If the authorized set of data user is , the algorithm defines I = {i :
The algorithm outputs outsourced ciphertext
The encryption process is divided into two parts: encrypting files and encrypting keyword.
, outsourced ciphertext CT and access policy M, ρ, x ρ(i) as input. It chooses a vector v = (s, γ 2 , · · · , γ n ) ∈ Z n p , s is a secret, γ 2 , · · · , γ n are random value. For i ∈ I , it calculates λ i = v · M i , M i represents the vector of i-th row in M. It chooses τ ∈ Z p at random, computeŝ
αs ,
The algorithm outputs ciphertext
(ii) Encrypt − keyword PP, w, CT → Index: This algorithm makes public parameter PP, keyword w and outsourced ciphertext CT as input. It arbitrarily choosesτ ∈ Z p , computes
The algorithm outputs keyword index
Finally, the encryption algorithm outputs ciphertext
j∈ [1,m] , Index
TokenGen PP, w , SK → Tok: Taking as inputs public parameter PP, keyword w and secret key SK . This algorithm randomly selects ε ∈ Z p , computes
The algorithm outputs keyword token [1,k] to ODS to perform outsourced decryption algorithm. This algorithm inputs CT and SK . If data user's attribute set satisfies access structure, there is a constant ω i ∈ Z p i∈I , so that i∈I ω i M i = (1, 0, · · · , 0), where M i indicates the vector of i-th row in M. It performs following calculation:
The algorithm outputs intermediate ciphertext 
TrapGen (PP, S, SK ) → TR: This algorithm inputs public parameter PP, attribute set S and secret key SK . It selects ε ∈ Z p at random, and computes
The algorithm outputs trapdoor 
, it shows M A = M B , the algorithm outputs 1 and otherwise outputs 0.
Correctness: The following is the correctness verification process of the algorithm in our scheme. 1) Search: If the keyword in index is the same as the keyword in token, then the equation (1) holds. It indicates that the matching is successful, DU can obtain the desired ciphertext. = 1 2) Decryption: The decryption operation is as follows: Through the above calculation of equation (2)- (5), there is
3) Equality test: For equation (7)- (10) 
There is
, it shows that CT A and CT B contain the same plaintext.
VI. SECURITY PROOF A. CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT SECURE GAME
To prove the security of our scheme, suppose that there is a PPT adversary A and a challenge matrix that satisfies the constraints, A breaks the proposed scheme with a non-negligible advantage on selective conditions. Based on such an attacker, we construct a PPT simulator B that solves the decisional q−1 assumption with a non-negligible advantage. For the proof of selective security, A needs to submit a challenge access policy before the game starts, and then through the indistinguishability process of the two ciphertexts to achieve the security proof of the scheme. Chosen-plaintext security means that A can select the plaintext and obtain the corresponding ciphertext. Theorem 1: If the decisional q − 1 assumption holds, all PPT adversaries have a challenge matrix of size l × n, where l, n ≤ q, and they break the proposed scheme with a negligible advantage on selective conditions. Proof: The simulator performs the following chosenplaintext secure game with adversary, we use the secure game to testify the above theorem. Figure 4 shows the interaction between the simulator and the adversary in the secure game.
Initialization. A commits a challenge access policy M * , ρ * , x ρ * (i) to B, where M * is a shared matrix of size
then selects three one-way hash functions: Additionally, B implicitly sets α = a q+1 +α, α = a q+1 +α , f = g a . It computes
The public parameter and master secret key are as follows: 
Since S is an unauthorized attribute set that does not satisfy
And computes
Besides, for all i ∈ |S | , B must calculate
at random, and implicitly sets
Afterwards, B computes
Consequently, B outputs secret key
At the same time, B randomly chooses η ∈ Z p , generates the trapdoor of equality test
B transmits SK 1 and TR to A.
Challenge. A commits two hash values H 1 (M 0 ), H 1 (M 1 ) to B, it runs Encrypt out and Encrypt − files algorithm to gain the ciphertext:
B flips a coin to choose b ∈ {0, 1}, computeŝ
For each row of matrix, B implicitly sets σ i = −sb i , and calculates
And sends it to A. Phase 2. Similar to Phase 1, the restriction is that attribute set cannot satisfy access policy.
Guess. A gives a guess b . If b = b, B outputs 1, it indicates that A gets Z = e (g, g) sa q+1 and wins the game. Otherwise B outputs 0, it indicates that Z is a random element in G 2 .
If Z = e(g, g) sa q+1 , B successfully simulates the real scheme, becausê
In other words, if Z is a random element in G 2 , H 1 (M b ) is completely hidden in the challenge ciphertext. The advantage of A wins the game can be defined as
If A breaks the secure game with a non-negligible advantage, B can solve the decisional q − 1 assumption with a non-negligible advantage. Because the decisional q − 1 assumption is a hard problem, our scheme proves to be chosen-plaintext security.
B. CHOSEN-KEYWORD SECURE GAME Theorem 2: If an adversary can win the chosen-keyword secure game with a non-negligible advantage ε, then we can construct a simulator to solve DDH assumption with advantage ε.
Proof: Given a tuple (g, g z 1 , g z 2 , Z ) of DDH problem and sent it to a simulator, where g, Z ∈ G 1 ,z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z p . The simulator's task is to determine whether Z = g z 1 z 2 or Z is a random element in G 1 . Therefore, simulator B executes the following chosen-keyword secure game with adversary A.
Setup.
where H 4 is a one-way hash function. It generates public parameter PP = (g, f , g 1 , g 2 ) and master secret key MSK = (β 1 , β 2 ), while making PP to public. Phase 1. A issues adaptive queries: Token query: A gives a query keyword w , B chooses ξ ∈ Z p at random, computes
Challenge. A arbitrarily chooses two keywords w 0 , w 1 . B flips a coin to select b ∈ {0, 1}, and randomly chooses
Phase 2. Similar to Phase 1, but the restriction is that A cannot query the keyword w 0 , w 1 anymore.
Guess. A outputs a guess keyword w b , b ∈ {0, 1} according as
If b = b, it means that the keyword guessed by the adversary is the same as the keyword encrypted by the simulator, there is Therefore when b = b, B outputs 1, it shows that A gets Z = g z 1 z 2 and wins the game. Otherwise B outputs 0, it shows that Z is a random element in G 1 .
Since the DDH problem is hard to solve, we can't construct a simulator to solve it with a non-negligible advantage, hence there is no PPT adversary wins the above game with a non-negligible advantage, the proposed scheme proves to be chosen-keyword security.
VII. PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSES
In order to analyze the performance of solution, we mainly compare the differences in function and algorithm efficiency between our scheme and other related literatures.
We list the performance comparison (Table 4) between the proposed scheme and literatures [2] , [48] , [50] , [51] , [55] - [58] . It can be seen that most of the schemes adopt CP-ABE, and the access policies used are LSSS, access tree and AND gate. Both our scheme and the literature [55] support keyword search. Although literatures [2] , [56] , [57] all involve outsourced computing, only [57] and our scheme support fully outsourced, [2] , [56] only use outsourced decryption. In addition, the proposed scheme and literatures [48] , [50] , [58] have equality test judgment for ciphertext. In brief, our scheme is more comprehensive in function than other literatures.
On the basis of Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library [59] , we mainly consider three time complexity algorithms: multiplication, exponential and pairing operation. To be specific, K indicates the number of attributes that satisfy access policy, N indicates the number of attributes owned by data user, l 1 indicates the number of wildcards in access policy, L 1 indicates the maximum number of wildcards (In our scheme, let K = N , l 1 = L 1 ). The environment of the hardware runtime is Intel Core i5-3470 CPU @ 3.20GHz, and RAM is 4.00GB. The software runtime environment is JDK 1.7.5, JPBC 2.0.0 and MyEclipse 10. According to the construction principle of the scheme, we choose the seven phases of secret key generation, encryption, token generation, search, decryption, trapdoor generation and equality test to compare the algorithm efficiency of our scheme with the literatures [48] , [50] , [51] , [55] .
First, Table 5 contains four algorithms. In the secret key generation phase, the algorithm of our scheme takes more time than the literatures [48] , [50] , less than the literatures [51] , [55] , where the time-consuming of the algorithm is mainly the exponential operation of elements in group G 1 . The encryption phase is the same as the secret key generation phase, since the encryption algorithm of proposed scheme consists of two parts and involves more exponential operations, which will take longer time, thus our algorithm efficiency is lower than [48] , [50] , higher than [51] , [55] . In the token generation and search phase, because literatures [48] , [50] , [51] do not support the keyword search function, we do not calculate the algorithm time of literatures [48] , [50] , [51] . Compared with the literature [55] , the algorithm time of our scheme is constant in these two phases, and the algorithm efficiency is higher than [55] .
Then, Table 6 contains three algorithms. In the decryption phase, the literature [55] is an ABSE scheme, which does not contain the decryption operation. Compared with literatures [48] , [50] , [51] , our scheme has the least time-consuming and the highest efficiency, the algorithm time is constant and does not vary with the number of attributes. In the trapdoor generation and equality test phase, literatures [51] , [55] do not have this function, and our scheme is mainly compared with the literatures [48] , [50] . It can be seen that the algorithm time of our scheme in these two phases is higher than [48] , [50] , but it is better than [48] , [50] in other aspects.
In order to make the efficiency comparison more intuitive, we draw the efficiency comparison figure 5-9 for the five phases of secret key generation, encryption, search, decryption and equality test. On the whole, the efficiency of our scheme is higher than other literatures.
Due to the large amount of computing of pairing operation, the general ABE schemes cannot be directly applied to resource-constrained IoT devices. Therefore, For the sake of solving this problem under the premise of ABE security, we adopt outsourcing technology. In CP-ABE schemes, the size of ciphertext largely depends on the number of attributes in access policy. It can be seen from Figure 8 that the decryption operation time of our scheme is constant, and it does not change with the number of attributes. Besides outsourced decryption, the outsourcing technology in the secret key generation and encryption phase also greatly reduces the local storage and computational burden, so that the proposed scheme is suitable for IoT devices.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Currently, there are more and more devices connected to IoT. With the help of cloud server, these IoT devices reduce the burden of computing and storage while ensuring data security and privacy, which makes the IoT more widely available. In this paper, we propose KS-ABESwET in IoT, on the basis of general CP-ABE scheme, the inverted index is used to implement a more practical keyword search, which solves the data search problem of IoT devices. For the sake of reducing local load, a large number of calculations in scheme are outsourced to the server, the resource-constrained IoT terminal only needs to perform very few operations. In addition, our scheme supports the equality test, so that ACS can determine whether two ciphertexts encrypted by different access policies contain the same plaintext without decrypting ciphertext, which is beneficial to ciphertext classification and accurate decryption, decreasing storage resource consumption of IoT devices. Subsequently, based on the decisional q − 1 assumption and DDH assumption, the proposed scheme is proved to be chosen-plaintext security and chosen-keyword security. Moreover, we compare the performance and efficiency of the solution with other relevant literatures, which indicates that our scheme is practical. In the future, how to simplify the equality test algorithm and achieve OW-CCA security will be a problem that needs to further study.
